'Rate of Rebound' From Extreme Starting Point, To Slow

Posted by urbandigs

Mon Mar 15th, 2010 09:31 AM

A: It has been a year since the extreme set in across most asset prices and markets. Sometimes I think we forget just how volatile and how dramatic the markets reaction was to severe credit stresses. It is quite astonishing to see how the mindsets of investors have changed since that time; from complete fear to perceived sustainable reflation. For Manhattan real estate, the next 3 months should start to reflect the rate of rebound from the miserable Q1 2009 data; via the Q1 & Q2 2010 reports. I already discussed the expectation of a very strong y-o-y Q1 report that will be released in a few weeks. When I look back to the confidence levels of market participants exactly one year ago I think about the high level of perceived distress on future expectations, elevated risk premiums due to market uncertainty, and how this affected buyers' offers for Manhattan property. The resulting extreme came on quickly and severely marking a 'starting point' for future stability to eventually build upon. Looking ahead, expect the 'rate of rebound' to slow from this point on as buyers' already priced out the very serious risks that caused the furious adjustment process for Manhattan property. To me, the market continues to trade at an adjusted lower level from peak but at slightly improved levels from the height of distress one year ago.

Asset prices across all classes saw an incredible rise over the course of 2009 as the fed managed to stage a huge 'search for yield/dollar carry trade' for investors. This was especially true for riskier asset prices. The rise was historic only because of the uber distressed levels that we began from. If we look back twelve months ago, even for Manhattan residential property, we must also go back in time & place to a period marked by:

  • immense uncertainty over the banking system and global economy

  • the perception of huge counter-party risks

  • a dysfunctional interbank lending environment

  • tremendous negative wealth effect from plunging asset prices

  • hugely elevated risk premiums as credit markets blew out

  • perceived risk of a systemic collapse of global banking systems & economies


  • Those that understood the nature of the crisis and worked right in the middle of the storm, experienced the most fear. And since the Manhattan residential real estate marketplace centers around a Wall Street that was bleeding half to death, the fear was especially high and dramatic!

    What's my point? Right now we are just over 1 year removed from the height of this fear; and to look back at the changes between the two time periods is quite amazing. The extremes were simply that dramatic and because of that an environment was ripe for a natural market rebound from an extreme starting point! Here is a quick snapshot of some market indexes and credit indicators on March 9th, 2009 and where they closed on Friday:

  • S&P 500 was at 676; Friday it closed @ 1,149

  • DJIA was at 6,547; Friday it closed @ 10,624

  • The VIX was at 49.68; Friday it closed @ 17.58

  • TED Spread was at 96bps, down from 465bps in October, 2008; Friday it was @ 12bps


  • The TED spread, or the difference between the 3-month risk free T-Bill rate and the 3-month LIBOR rate, really captured the extreme nature of the crisis as the measure blew out to over 450 basis points in October 2008 (the VIX blew out to over 80 at this time too); reflecting the markets concerns over interbank credit risk at the time:

    TED_Spread_Chart_-_Data_to_9_26_08.jpg

    Those moves were not some minor blip in an otherwise general trend. No way. Rather, those moves were signs of the markets' cardiac arrest! The long term average of the TED spread is about 30-50 basis points. Since the credit markets were leading the equity markets for late 2007 and much of 2008, the extreme moves in the TED spread were a signal of the shocks that were to come in both the stock markets and debt markets as we approached March 2009. For Manhattan residential real estate, it was the March stock market lows that really pinpointed the timing of the height of fear for buyers out there submitting bids and sellers hitting them to move property at the time. In other words, there were no strong bids and offers that were submitted "priced in" plenty of future downside risk that had not yet took place.

    Now take a step back. Look at this extreme and imagine what kind of starting point it resulted in for Manhattan real estate when comparing market forces one year later. The progressive improvement in bids for Manhattan property that resulted from the historic rise in all asset classes for much of 2009, began from a highly extreme starting point! That is the key take-away of this discussion. Naturally, the rate of rebound from highly distressed levels will be noticeable and eventually, self-defeating; similar to $150 oil prices causing extreme demand destruction worldwide for the commodity.

    Stocks are a proxy for everything and it should be no surprise that bids for apartments in a market such as Manhattan, improved just like all asset classes improved from that extreme distressed starting point one year ago. For now, its more of a return to normalcy after such extremes of pricing in and pricing out market/credit risk and near term economic uncertainty.

    From my observations over a 12-month period, this market continues to trade at an adjusted lower level from peak in 2007 but at an improved level from early 2009. I expect the next 2-3 quarterly reports to ultimately show this rate of rebound from the extreme starting point; with the largest percentage rebounds in the higher price points for logical reasons. In the meantime, I continue to keep a watchful eye for any signs that the recent market action might soon start to abate. The two biggest macro threats I see on the horizon that can directly affect our real estate markets are:

    1) bond markets reactions to a fed preparing of an exit strategy and the scheduled end to Agency/MBS purchases; i.e. higher lending rates

    and...

    2) any disruption to the historic rise in most asset classes (stocks, HY/IG corporate debt, other riskier assets) resulting from the withdrawal of fed guarantees, a stronger dollar and carry trade unwind

    As usual, what is going on today in Manhattan's real estate market does not necessarily have to jive with my longer term macro concerns that we are yet to deal with.


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