A: Well, not a surprise actually. Anyone surprised by this report simply has decided to keep their head in the sand, to hold on to hope. That's OK, as long as you don't make extreme tradable bets based on this hope. As I have discussed over the past few months here on UrbanDigs, the likely next fed move will be a CUT, not a hike, as the fed futures traders and mass media led us to believe. Today's surge in unemployment, downward revisions in past jobs data, and continuing shedding of US jobs, puts the spotlight back towards economic growth. As a result, fed futures are now in the process of shifting their bias towards a rate cut, from bets on a rate hike previously to combat commodity inflation.
First the news, from Bloomberg:
Payrolls fell by 84,000 in August, and revisions added another 58,000 to job losses for the prior two months, the Labor Department said today in Washington. The jobless rate jumped to 6.1 percent, matching the level of September 2003, from 5.7 percent the prior month.
In late July, I had the privilege of speaking at the
Inman BULL vs BEAR (link to summary of what speakers said) debate with amazing bloggers such as Bill from
Calculated Risk, Yves from
Naked Capitalism, and John Williams of
Shadowstats. The video of this debate from about 6-7 weeks ago is at
Inman Videos.
Those at the debate were a bit taken back by the negativity bias of the panel, but instead should have been appreciative to get such unbiased, real-time forward looking opinions on the state of the macro economy, credit markets, and housing market. Attendees heard first hand my thoughts on the near term which included the following statements:
a) massive credit deflation/contraction
b) deteriorating jobs market / rising unemployment
c) strapped consumer from commodity inflation makes for a perfect storm
d) pipeline pressure for Case Shiller Index
e) no 'V' shaped recovery in housing
f) years of deleveraging process / overly optimistic wall street CEO's to instill confidence
g) GSE's ability to fund themselves short term
h) no wage inflation
We are at now now. The story is the same, and to me it seems pretty clear how it will end. John Williams hyper inflation may come, but it will be as a result of all the intervention that our government & fed are likely to do as this cycle continues.
Over the past few months, everyone was expecting a rate hike to combat the inflation problem. Right now, we do not have the TYPE OF INFLATION THAT OUR FED WILL RAISE RATES FOR. If we had wage inflation and a rapid expansion of credit/money supply, then yes, our fed will aggressively raise rates. But we do not have this. Mish has been the poster boy for this mis-understood dynamic for a while now, and his blog GlobalEconomic Analysis is a daily must read; no matter how gloomy it may seem!
Readers should understand the environment we are in. Unfortunately, this is the process that we must go through to eventually see the light. Lets not delay it, lets not postpone it, lets use judgment on any bailouts, lets let those companies that should fail, fail, and let those who took unprecedented risk using too much leverage be punished and not let the taxpayers foot the bill. This story is not yet over.
How about some help with the heavy lifting Uncle Sam?
I've been contemplating this piece for quite a while, but with so much focus on inflation and the weak dollar decimating consumer purchasing power lately, I've written more on why inflation was the wrong bugaboo to be afraid of. I am going to declare temporary victory on the inflation question, despite what the ECB may think. I'll address "the great confidence game" of whether the threat of U.S. debt default causes hyperinflation and a third-world-type currency crisis here in the U.S. when the time comes....and at some point it may, but I'm not currently in that camp though I know that many are.
Yesterday, Bill Gross of Pimco (aka The King of Bonds) put out an investment strategy piece which was viewed as significantly more negative than in the more recent past (it may have even helped in the 300 point+ rout in the stock market). Now Gross is known on the street for talking his book and for sometimes being early, as he was on the housing crisis. He suffered poor relative performance for a year due to his bearish economic bet, before blowing the doors off everyone else when he was proven right. In fact, this makes perfect sense, because he is driving an oil tanker, he has to be early, and since he controls so much money, when he wants to change his bets it may behoove him to talk his book up to help generate demand for the other side of his trade. In his piece Gross enumerates what happens in a delevering cycle (and I thank him for doing my piece for me, but much more succinctly).
1) Risk spreads, liquidity spreads, volatility, term premiums – they all go up.
2) Delevering slows/stops when assets have been liquidated and/or sufficient capital has been raised to produce an equilibrium.
3) The raising of sufficient capital now depends on the entrance of new balance sheets. Absent that, prices of almost all assets will go down.
Gross goes on to explain what these three points mean and in the process he reminds us of some things that we already know in our guts but may be prefer to ignore. These are my interpretations.
Throwing out the baby with the bathwater - When people get burned in one asset they often sell other assets that have not yet been decimated in order to meet margin calls or just raise cash.
Relative value trading - investments with yield that get cratered increase in yield, which makes yields on other stuff look kind of thin in a "risky environment" this leads to mark downs across related assets. The risky stuff gets hit much harder and the spreads between assets rise, but everything sees it's risk premium rise.
Insurance policy prices rise - this is where the volatility part comes in. Those who would sell you you an insurance policy that would put a floor under your losses get nervous about the extreme swings in value (mostly to the downside), euphemistically called volatility and they raise the price of insurance policies/hedges.
What's left that we can sell? - With a prohibitively high cost of hedging risk, people have to worry a lot more about whether they can sell an asset that declines in value, rather than whether they want to. This is liquidity risk. Assets that are more liquid go down less, than the more illiquid ones, but liquid assets get dragged down, too, because they can at least be sold.
Standing Back - If all of this "negative feedback" isn't bad enough, eventually those who are not over-levered and have capital to invest become risk averse because they keep trying to call a bottom too early and continually get their fingers burnt. Pimco admits to being too early buying certain assets, along with many other smart investors. This general risk aversion is what keeps fresh capital from coming in and helping stop the deleveraging feedback loop.
Gross finishes his letter by calling on the government to get involved before risk aversion really sets in for good. How would this work? Gross' prior August letter dedicated quite a bit of space to the problem of the fed cutting interest rates but costs of mortgages going straight up anyway and pressuring housing prices further. Noah and I have commented on the incredibly pernicious impacts of this many times in the last few months. Here is a chart from Pimco's August investment letter, showing the impact of the Fed's rate cuts on the cost of borrowing for home mortgages.

It is and has been obvious to all that the Fed is "pushing on a string."
Ben Bernanke is known for his work on Japan's lost decade and one of the strategies that Japan nearly had to enact, when they had held interest rates at zero for several years and still couldn't stop the deflation, called quantitative easing. This is when the government actually goes out and buys debt, boosting prices, providing liquidity and easing volatility (they have already done a half step towards this with the "loan facilities" provided to banks and the Street). Uncle Sam could effectively do the same thing by just helping consumers get mortgages more easily, thus cushioning the housing market so those with cash can and do come in to buy houses and all the securities associated with housing. Either way it's on the government's tab. My guess is that they will do both. The question is just what is the most efficient policy mix to stop the asset deflation and de-levering (margin call) cycle.
Gross includes an ominous warning to the Feds with the following chart:

This composite chart of U.S. housing prices, stocks and bonds, shows the significant negative wealth effect now underway due to the effects of deleveraging. he notes that this magnitude of combined decline has not happened since the Great Depression and that this is what separates this financial crisis from prior ones where markets were hit. Gross provides some levity in his letter with commentary about his fascination with Jim Cramer and the idea that there is always a bull market somewhere. However, he makes a sharp point that as of now, as evidenced by the commodity rollover, there is nowhere for investors to run.
Pimco's flagship fund, Pimco Total Return, has gotten $15 billion of new money year to date, according to today's Wall Street Journal. The recent commentary is signed Booyah Hank? as if addressed to Hank Paulson (no doubt treasury would have to print a bunch of money to back up the Fed's efforts at quantitative easing and would have to help convince the government to intervene in the housing market in a big way). Is Gross sending a message to the Feds? I'll buy, but only if you buy first? A lot of smart money along with FWFs, private equity players and hedge funds might be tempted to follow his lead if Uncle Sam steps up....there is of course the eventual bar tab. Like I said, more on "The Great Confidence Game" in a future post.