Fannie/Freddie Rescue Talks Intensify
A: Something that will affect all of us, when it happens. I use the word 'when', because quite simply, the only way these institutions are saved is if the US housing market has bottomed already and is in the process of recovery right now. I don't think anyone believes this is the case. Add in the fact that these two have taken very conservative mark downs on their toxic assets so far, when the tradable markets value these 'hard-to-trade' securities at much lower levels, and I get the feeling that the problems are being delayed, and not resolved. On quick view, I see that FNMA 5-YR spreads to treasuries has now widened to about 93 basis points, as investors appetite for Fannie credit risk diminishes. Should this spread widen to 125-150 basis points, we may have a problem on our hands.
First lets get to the charts. Below is a chart comparing 5-YR FNMA Agency yields to 5-YR Treasury yields; showing you the 93 basis points spread, about 10 basis points wider than yesterday:

*table courtesy of Vanguard Bond Yields
Second, here is a chart showing us the rise in premium (+21.9 basis points, or 10.55% since yesterday) required for credit protection (CDS) on Fannie Mae:

*chart courtesy of CMAVision Top 5 Widening Spread Movers
I do not have a bloomberg terminal, nor am I a credit default swap trader, so my access to this kind of information is very limited. However, I'll explain to you what I do know as I understand it and you can feel free to correct me or add to the discussion if you are more knowledgeable of these markets.
The CDS trade is the cost of buying protection in case of default. It is compared to zero. if the entity is riskless then the spread should be zero. If you are talking about the change then it's compared to itself on the previous day, same as a stock price change, only here a positive change is bad.
This means that to buy protection on Fannie's subordinated debt you have to pay 230bps per year (times the notional). So for a dollar of notional it will cost you 2.3 cents to insure, hence higher is implying greater probability of default and/or greater loss given default (lower recovery).
The conclusion from this graph is that you can tell there is not much appetite for Fannie credit risk and it's about as bad as it has been in the past.
Both Mish & Calculated Risk have discussion's on Freddie Mac's awful report issued yesterday:
From MISH:
Anyone following Alt-A mortgages knows that Freddie's claim is simply preposterous. Freddie has $130 billion in subprime and Alt-A loans. Somehow CEO Richard Syron wants us to believe the problem will go away if left on its own.
From CALCULATED RISK:
This graph from the Freddie investor's slides shows the default rates of Alt-As vs. the rest of the portfolio.For those not in tune with the credit crisis, Alt-A is 'near prime' or those mortgages considered in quality to be in between subprime & prime. News reports of warnings inside Freddie Mac being ignored surfaced this week, and speaks volumes about this entire credit/housing downturn experienced thus far. In short, they wanted to keep the party going! Well, as in all long-lasting parties, the hangover will be great. From NYTimes.com:
As we've been discussing, the 2nd wave of defaults it just starting, and Alt-A will be ground zero this time.
The chief executive of the mortgage giant Freddie Mac rejected internal warnings that could have protected the company from some of the financial crises now engulfing it, according to more than two dozen current and former high-ranking executives and others.Just unbelievable. Now, Bill Gross of PIMCO (who owns a ton of US Agency debt) is saying that the US Treasury will be forced to buy as much as $30,000,000,000 of Fannie/Freddie preferred shares to bolster investors confidence for the institutions. Why you ask? Simple. These two institutions borrow short & lend long. With their stock prices in the dump, they wont be able to raise capital so easily by selling shares. If they can no longer borrow short at reasonable rates, we have a very big problem. That is why I included a chart showing you the spread of FNMA 5-YR yields to 5-YR Treasury yields. In normal times, the spread is about 50 basis points. In distressed times, it rises as risk rises. Today, its around 93 basis points. If that rises above 125-150 bps or so, the credit markets as a whole will get very shaky and that is something we just do NOT want right now! Fannie & Freddie must be able to fund themselves and that means investors need to be willing to do so at somewhat reasonable levels!
That chief executive, Richard F. Syron, in 2004 received a memo from Freddie Mac’s chief risk officer warning him that the firm was financing questionable loans that threatened its financial health. In an interview, Freddie Mac’s former chief risk officer, David A. Andrukonis, recalled telling Mr. Syron in mid-2004 that the company was buying bad loans that "would likely pose an enormous financial and reputational risk to the company and the country."
But as they sat in a conference room, Mr. Syron refused to consider possibilities for reducing Freddie Mac’s risks, said Mr. Andrukonis, who left in 2005 to become a teacher.
"He said we couldn’t afford to say no to anyone," Mr. Andrukonis said. Over the next three years, Freddie Mac continued buying riskier loans.
We truly are at a crossroads and the existence of these two overly leveraged, overly exposed institutions are at grave risk. I wonder what the world would be like if Fannie & Freddie were nationalized, and shareholders wiped out? Thoughts?



Posted by david
Thu Aug 7th, 2008 12:21 PM
Could some one please explain why Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac even owned subprime and alt-a assets in the first place? I thought that those companies were chartered to guarantee "conforming" loans in order to provide cheaper financing for borrowers that meet certain financial criteria. Am I wrong to think that the distinction between conforming and non-conforming is the same as prime versus subprime and alt-a?
Posted by Noah
Thu Aug 7th, 2008 12:30 PM
David - GREAT question. As I understand it, and I followed this site to do so (http://www.planetloan.com/library/home_loans_types.html):
Conforming lenders always require a minimum of a 620 credit score, and use a computerized underwriting process to determine approval. Besides credit score, other important factors for approval include: payment history for mortgage and revolving accounts over the last 24 months, debt-to-income ratio, employment history, amount of down payment, and the amount of liquid reserves.
Alternative "A" credit lenders, or Alt-A, offer aggressive loan financing products catering to borrowers with credit scores from 660 and up. While these lenders offer programs to borrowers with scores down to 620, the aggressive programs are typically not available to borrowers below a 660 middle score. Alt-A banks have driven the creation of innovative loan products over the last few years.
Me again. Tricky part is exactly what FNM/FRE boundaries are. I'll have to check into it. But, clearly they started to buy ALT-A when the secondary mortgage markets started to go bad and someone needed to step up providing liquidity to keep the party going. Im sure they took on their most toxic assets from 2006-2007 when housing started to turn nationally, and they tried to pick up the slack. Now here we are.
Posted by Noah
Thu Aug 7th, 2008 03:14 PM
FNMA 5-YR Spread to Treasury is now 101 bps
Posted by jeff
Thu Aug 7th, 2008 05:56 PM
I have a couple of hypothetical answers to your question, but unfortunately no data to back it up. Fannie and Freddie' charters are to widen home ownership, the American dream blah blah blah, and they were born out of the depression era when no one could get credit. They have for years participated in HUD related programs and even done guarantees on commercial real estate debt, all in the name of boosting affordable housing and home ownership generally. Until 7 or 8 years ago when they underwrote loans to guarantee, they required a 20% downpayment by the borrower. However, you could put 10% down if you also bought mortgage insurance from MGIC, Triad Guarantee, GE, AIG, Radian or PMI. Congress got made at the latter cos in the Mid 90s for not actively letting borrowers know when the equity in their homes had reached a point when they didn't need to keep paying for mortgage insurance...I think this is when the subprime mortgage business started. The whole system of lending to people who lacked the 20% downpayment started to shift away from Fannie & Fred and the mortgage insurers as mortgage cos. started to originate this stuff anf Wall Street packaged it took it straight to the market sans the government guarantee. Yield hungry investors snapped it up and booming real estate prices made it all work and Congress saw that it was good (for the little guy). As a result much of the incremental growth in home-ownership during the boom was in "non-conforming" including ARMs, Alt A etc. in recent years and so Fan and Fred lost out on a lot of market share. (It also happened that a lot of the borrowing was for investment specualtion where maximum leverage was decided). For many years, particularly when rates were rising and mortgage originations falling, Fan & Fred worked on growing another profit center, buying and holding their own guaranteed paper. Now recall that when interest rates go up mortgages stay in place longer, so their maturities increase and their value actually increases. By buying this paper whenever the market was soft, Fan & Fred bought earnings insurance for periods when rates were rising and originations were soft. They got to be great mortgage backed securities traders...or so they thought. So my theory is that when they lost share in origination during the real estate boom (and after being beat up for cooking their books by Congress), they participated even more heavily in the purchase market by buying paper others offered, which carried juicy yields. I think the historical info here is pretty accurate, but the reason they ramped up purchases of this crud is speculation on my part, but it has the ring of truth.
Posted by david
Thu Aug 7th, 2008 06:26 PM
let's be careful on the concept that higher rates increase the value of existing mortgages. while borrowers are less likely to repay loans - increasing the duration of the loan - interest rates and bond prices are inversely related. so, now you will have a borrower playing you below market interest rates for an extended period of time, which is not a good thing. that's why mortgage bonds are tricky investments. if rates go down, your mortgage paper is worth more but is likely to be repaid sooner - I think some traders call it negatively convex, but I have no idea what that means.
Posted by jeff
Fri Aug 8th, 2008 11:24 AM
You are correct it is negative convexity which is the charateristic of the attenuation of maturity due to interest rate decline, you are also correct that as rates go up mortgages don't necessarily go up in value so much as outperform bonds that don't have pre-payment risk and there are other factors involved, like years to maturity etc.
Posted by Query1
Fri Aug 8th, 2008 02:17 PM
It also may be worthwhile to keep an eye on the price for mortgage bonds themselves. Some think those prices may fall and the yields move up because of the possibility that these GSE guaranteed and held securities may have to be sold by the GSEs as a way to raise capital. These would be the mortgage bonds that had older vintage and lower risk of default. I don't pretend to know how those bonds get sorted out from the "crud" but I presume the market knows and those non-crud bond prices are the ones I'm trying to refer to. Interestingly, if those prices did fall Mr. Gross's big investment in them probably would take a hit. That could be one reason why he is among those looking for the government to purchase the agencies preferred stock. But that is just a guess on my part.
Posted by Cab
Mon Aug 11th, 2008 07:55 AM
Just a quick point of clarification. FNMA and FHLMC have senior debt and subordinated debt (subordinated is much much smaller issuance than senior and was an experiment by the agencies). If markets anticipated a "bail-out" the senior debt spread would tighten as they would converge to Treasuries on anticipation of a bail-out. If they widened than the market is anticipating for the agencies to survive as is. At this point the senior is trading strong and the subordinated weaker. The market is thinking that a "bailout" would only be for senior debt and not sub. So when you talk spreads just be wary of which debt you are talking about...
Posted by Noah
Mon Aug 11th, 2008 10:51 AM
Cab - excellent. Thank you so much for providing that clarification!!
Posted by Phil Collins
Tue Aug 12th, 2008 01:00 PM
These are the opinions of Robert Sheridan, CEO of Sheridan & Partners, a real estate & development company. Their site is www.sheridanpartners.com/market.php
A Bad Thing for Housing Gets Worse
The lead article in the 8/4/08 issue of The New York Times by Vikas Bajaj, “Housing Lenders Fear Bigger Wave of Loan Defaults,” comes as no surprise. Bajaj’s reporting illuminates a problem that has been apparent for a long time: foreclosures will be greater than recent estimates (now, even homeowners with good credit are finding themselves caught up in the morass) and price declines are likely to be deeper.
What is not immediately as obvious is that this bigger-than-expected wave of defaults will likely push “the bottom” out further. It’s hard to see it occurring in most markets before 2010.
Read the article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/business/04lend.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=vikas%20bajaj&st=cse&oref=slogin
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