Bonuses: It's 2009 That Will Hurt More
A: This is Manhattan real estate, and this is wall street bonus season. When it comes to wall street bonuses, we must understand one thing: REVENUE vs INCOME. Bonuses are generally calculated using generated revenue, not income, which leads us to what happened in 2007! For the first half of 2007, revenues generated by the investment banks, brokerages, trading desks, and banks were very high! Then came the meltdown in mid July starting with the ABX indices signaling distress in the credit markets. Within a few weeks Bear Stearns started the credit crunch wave by announcing the failure of 2 funds. That is when the credit & secondary mortgage markets changed drastically. My point, bonuses will be granted this year; its 2009 that we will have to worry about!
When I first starting trading equities professionally in 1998, stocks were listed on exchanges in fractions. What I mean is, the level 2 trading quotes that the trading software accessed showed bids and asks in fractions. For example, when EBAY was trading around $100 a share, the bid would be say 99 3/4 and the ask would be something like 100 1/8. The spread between the bid/ask was 3/8's (often spreads got as low as 1/6 or teenies as we used to call them). This spread, wider as a result of the equity trading in fractions, opened up the opportunity to trade and exploit the spread. It also made stock movements much more volatile, and as a trader, volatility is a very close friend!
Then came decimalization around 2002 I believe, can't remember. Stocks no longer traded in fractions, and instead started trading in dollars & cents. So, that same EBAY trade that I described above would now have a bid / ask more similar to say 99.98 x 99.99, giving us a penny spread. With spreads so tight, stocks just didn't move the way they used to; and a crash from the dot com bubble didnt help either. The game was over in my mind!
Back to the discussion so I can relate the analogy. The derivatives trade of securitizing loans and selling them off in pieces on the secondary mortgage markets generated billions in revenue for these banks & brokerages. Now that the housing bubble popped nationally, risk has been re-priced, secondary mortgage markets are not functioning properly, liquidity dried up for mortgage backed securities, and the announcement of billions in losses and potential insolvencies, THE GAME IS OVER! How will these banks and brokerages generate the kind of revenue that they got used to generating the past few years?
Now, 2007 still saw at least 4-6 months of great revenue before the sh*t hit the fan and the game ended. The game is not coming back for a long time folks. So, looking ahead to 2008, we must wonder about the hit to generated revenue that these guys are going to take. And with a hit to revenue for a full 12 months, comes a hit to bonuses; 2007 was only 6 months of trouble, 2008 will be 12 months.
Which brings us to maintaining talent. As Goldman Sachs prepares to take over the world after being on the short side of the mortgage backed securities trade, competing brokerages and investment banks will be forced to pay out bonuses this year to keep their talent in house or risk losing them to the sharks!
From an anonymous insider I keep in touch with:
Looks like the real bonus cutting will be next year since banking revenues were so high in the first part of 2007 and the bonuses are calculated off revenue - not income. "Ultra-Luxury" retailers are still reporting good numbers for Christmas even though the same people who are doing the spending are saying they expect bonuses next year to be down significantly.Which brings us to the conclusion. Not only will 2008 prove a very difficult year for these guys to generate revenue anywhere near years before the credit crisis hit, but we are about to head into a period of layoffs as efforts to cut costs and restructure the company is a must to restore investor confidence and bully the stock price.Some of the banks started paying a bigger percentage of revenues as bonuses to try and keep up with Goldman - in the past they were paying 40-50% but it's up 10-20% in some cases. That can't last for long. Investors must be furious. They will have to cut headcount to get that "% of revenue" number back down.
In my opinion, its next year's bonus season that will prove to be much less than expected as generated revenue is way down in this post-credit crunch world. Add in the fact that job losses are inevitable, and you start to think reality rather than fantasy. I'll leave it up to you to relate this scenario to wall street, the economy & New York City housing.
I welcome any comments regarding this topic, especially from those working at trading desks, investment banks, & brokerages!

It is certainly possible that this incident had nothing to do with my customer's co-op package. Maybe she left her wallet somewhere. Perhaps someone at her office picked up some of the information she was faxing to me or to her mortgage lender out of the fax machine. But it does seem to be a bit too coincidental. I was happy to report that I had already shredded all of her personal information as I do with all board packages. Out of the dozens of co-op transactions I have done, none of my other customers have had this happen to them. 



For the record, I started discussing a dip in buyer confidence back in August, about 3 weeks after Bear Stearns kicked off the now infamous mortgage problems & credit concerns:


A: 
I recently encountered a situation where a buyer whom I thought was qualified, my sales manager thought was qualified, and the seller thought was qualified was turned down by a co-op board. 



When I wrote the 

I am representing a seller in a building with a difficult managing agent or a difficult co-op board (it is hard to say which & it could be a combination of the two. Perhaps they aren't being difficult, it might be that they just don't care?). The buyer was approved by the board to purchase the apartment on Thursday, December 20th. Normally, we'd schedule a closing date and be done in about two weeks, perhaps a little bit more due to the holiday season. So we should have closed before January 4th. 
First the news. According to Yahoo Finance article "
According to 






Lets just list what stimulus we have seen since late 2007:
As can be seen from the chart on the right, the spread (or premium in yield) investors are demanding from 'AAA' Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities has risen significantly (higher costs to borrow to buy these assets; uptrend is negative in this case). We knew spreads had widened, forcing banks to write down the values of some of these CMBSs, but what really worries me is that the widening has continued even as the fed has slashed rates. Fed cuts rates and borrowing cost goes up, not the math we want to see. 
Greenberg goes on to talk about Manhattan's own SL Green (whose management I quoted prominently here last week) as a poster child for this indicator. SL Green is reportedly trading at a 23% discount to its net asset value, despite being called one of the best office REITs and being focused almost exclusively on the strong New York City market. The stock is saying current NAV is over stated and is predicting lower operating incomes from the firm's office buildings.
I should clear up one major thing for readers here. The worries that I have and which I publicly discuss, are fueled by a national housing slump and the resulting fall in securities that come from it. Thats it. Should housing stabilize across the nation, inventories start to fall, sales volume pickup, and defaults/delinquencies go lower you will see alot of the problems we currently face go away. It's perfectly clear that the fed, the gov't and the private sector is doing everything they can to inject liquidity, aggressively ease monetary policy, push an economic stimulus plan and bail out the troubled institutions so that credit markets can operate normally again. Outside of housing, financial turmoil, and dysfunctional credit markets, the US & Global economies are fairly strong.
Back in September I did a piece called
The feds super aggressive fed rate cuts have a two pronged effect:

